The paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder CEO and other executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the period 1998-2001. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses following M&A completion and that UK CEOs and executive directors are rewarded more for the effort they place in order to accomplish an outside of their industry (large) merger rather than a horizontal (small) merger. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation. JEL Classification: G34; J33 Keywords: Executive compensation; managerial power; agency theory. 
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosive growth in UK and US boardroom pay and especially in its long-and short-term incentive elements. This is viewed as an attempt both to attract and motivate managerial talent and to obtain a desirable alignment of incentives between principals and agents. In this context, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are amongst the most visible and significant investment decisions executives can make due to their potential long-term effects. There is a huge literature on the impact of M&As. Within this, one can distinguish between two opposing views on the links between M&As and executive and, more specifically, CEO compensation.
On one hand, agency theory approaches view executive compensation as rewarding managerial skill in seeking out only those M&A deals that contribute to shareholder value creation. Put differently, it should discourage those valuedestroying deals highlighted in Jensen's (1986) Most of the existing literature on these issues relates to studies of samples of US M&A deals. The early literature points mainly to the detrimental effects of M&As for acquiring shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Moeller et al., 2003; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Kohers and Kohers, 2001 ). Hallock (1997) reports that the existence of interlocking board relations increases CEO pay. In addition, report that the larger the influencing power of CEOs over the selection of board members, the higher the levels of pay they receive. In a pioneering recent paper, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) argue that it is managerial power rather than value creation that drives the payment of M&A bonuses. Using a sample of 327 M&A deals in the USA [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , they find that more powerful CEOs receive significantly larger bonuses and engage in larger (relative to their firms) deals to which the market responds more negatively. They find no relation between bonus compensation and deal performance.
Although there are existing studies of UK executive compensation, none of them has analysed the issue of executive compensation in relation to M&A deals.
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The first and main contribution of this study is that it fills this lacuna in the literature by addressing the latter issue in a UK context. This is accomplished by employing a unique sample of 100 completed M&A bids in the UK over the [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] period. A second contribution is that we provide evidence consistent with the managerial power perspective for our sample. In this respect our study supports the findings of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) for the USA. A final contribution is that we distinguish between
CEOs and other executives as well as between UK and US bidders for UK targets.
The objective here is to shed light on the levels of compensation received by US acquirers of UK targets relative to that awarded to UK bidder companies.
Our empirical results indicate significant increases in executive pay in the year following the completion of the M&A deal. More precisely we find that some elements of pay are doubled or even tripled. We provide evidence that the power of the CEO on the board can account for such increases. Our results indicate that board size is a dominant factor in setting executive pay for bidding companies and that the levels of board independence are important in the levels of compensation received by UK bidding CEOs.
The lion's share of salary and bonus pay is paid to CEOs when compared to the average executive of their firm. Also, the former experience significantly higher (positive) rate of change in the levels of salary plus bonus received in the period before and following the acquisition than their executive counterparts, whose average rate is negative. There are significant differences on the levels of bonus and salary received by UK and US executives both in the year before and following the acquisition announcement. CEOs who also serve as chairmen for their companies receive substantially higher levels of salary plus bonus (around £3.4m) whereas the average executive receives £0.86m more than those in their peer companies whose CEO and chairman roles are separated. Board size significantly increases bonus and salary pay received by all executives, indicating that larger boards are associated with higher levels of pay for both CEOs and other executive directors. Finally, we report that UK executives of bidding companies receive significantly higher (lower) levels of cash pay when involved in a large (diversifying) as opposed to a small (within their industry) acquisition.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide information on sample formation and section 3 describes our variables. Section 4 offers analyses the empirical results while a final section concludes.
Data and methodology

Sample
UK listed companies have only recently begun to report relevant information on executive compensation following the recommendations of the Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) further reduces our sample size. As a result, we end up with a sample of some 100 companies that can be subdivided into 73 UK and 27 US bidding firms for targets based in the UK.
Post-M&A company performance
We use an event study methodology to examine the effects of the acquisition on shareholder wealth. We apply the market model, which is commonly used in the M&A literature. This allows for a comparison of our results with prior, predominately US, findings. Given our sample firms' characteristics, we use the FTSE-All Share (for UK bidders) and the S&P 500 (for US bidders) index returns as the benchmark for calculating company abnormal returns around and following the acquisition announcement.
The literature on abnormal returns for bidding companies over the announcement period has produced mixed results. On one hand, some researchers report positive performance (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Harris, 1989; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Doukas, 1995 , Cakici, 1996 . By contrast, others find either zero or even negative abnormal performance (Firth, 1979; Roll, 1986; Limmack, 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1990, 1994; Sudia, 1992; Datta and Puia, 1995; Danbolt, 1995) . In general, the sign of a bidder's performance following an acquisition transaction is associated with how the market reacts to the managerial decision. Thus negative returns indicate that the market evaluates CEO decisions to acquire as value destroying.
There is a variety of different explanations on what drives such market reaction and the subsequent abnormal performance. Travlos, (1987) finds that the method of pay for the acquisition is an important driver of returns (stock settlements are often associated with overvalued bidders). On those grounds, Harford (1999) shows that cash settlements generate positive signals towards the reduction of the agency costs of free-cash-flow, leading to positive returns irrespective of the quality of the investment itself. Other researchers (Fuller et al., 2002; Morck et al., 1990; Maquieira et al., 1997) report an association between the type of target and abnormal returns (returns to bidding companies involved in diversifying mergers are lower).
Also, it is possible that large firms involved in acquisition deals might signal to the market that they have exhausted their internal growth opportunities. As a result, a negative return may be observed following the transaction irrespective of whether there is value creation through the merger (Rosen, 2004) . Finally, the market reaction to a merger announcement may be a reflection of the value added on the entire merger strategy of the acquiring firm and not just one merger itself. We rule out such an effect by requiring that the bidder has made no more acquisition offers in the year of the bid.
To examine the short-run post merger company performance, we calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of our sample firms. Under the Market Model, we calculate:
The AR of a company is computed as the difference between its actual return less the return on a benchmark typically given by an appropriate market index:
where R it and R mt are the log returns of share i on day t and on the market index m,
respectively. Given that all the parameters are estimated in the test period, no adjustment is necessary. The CAR is the sum of all arithmetic abnormal returns (AR) in the chosen event window:
We select a variety of event windows from 2 days (-1; 0) up to 10 days (-5 ; +5) days surrounding the day of the M&A announcement.
Variables
Executive pay levels are determined by a number of factors. We identify three separate sets of indicators that might explain them. These are those associated with firm performance, executive skill and effort exerted in successful completion of the bid, and with CEO power. The former two are standard while the latter would indicate the extent to which the firm insider-control mechanisms are in place to protect shareholder wealth or to enhance CEO compensation. Although it may be difficult for remuneration committees to measure the time, effort and skill exerted by CEOs towards their completion in order to compensate them appropriately, it is expected that "compensation should rely on indirect measures of effort, such as performance measures". 5
Executive pay
Executives in both the UK and US are paid three separate forms of compensation.
They receive a cash component embracing their base salary and benefits called managerial emoluments, an annual cash bonus 6 and long-term awards. The latter consist of share options and long-term incentive plans (Ltips) while in the US it consists of option, Ltip payouts and restricted stock awards. 7 We define total cash pay (TCP) as the sum of bonus, salary and benefits received by executives. Similarly, total incentive pay (TIP) equals to the value of share option awards plus the future value of Ltip grants, and total pay (TP) is the sum of total cash and total incentive pay.
Choudhary and Orszag (2003) examine 130 UK large companies for the year 2002 and report that the level of CEO salary is decided on the basis of firm size and on competing companies' proposed salaries. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEO compensation for completing M&A deals in the US takes the form of cash bonus and that increases in such payments are related to managerial power rather than to performance. Morck et al. (1990) suggest that firms with better prior performance make better acquisitions. Barber and Lyon (1996) find that return on assets (ROA) is the most powerful measure for detecting abnormal performance when it actually is present. We employ a number of variables to capture for performance. Return on assets (ROA) is earnings over the book value of total assets; ROA growth is ROA in the year of acquisition over that of the previous year; Total shareholder return (TSR) is the annual growth in value of shareholdings assuming that dividends are reinvested;
and Margin is earnings divided by sales.
Executive skill and effort
Standard theory predicts that CEOs will be rewarded for the skill and effort exerted in
M&As. We expect that CEOs acquiring targets from the same industry will be rewarded with higher levels of bonus and no subsequent decreases in salary after the completion of the bid. We control for this effect with a dummy variable Industry that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquiring a target from a different industry and 0
otherwise. In addition, we control for deal complexity with the log of the number of days between the deal announcement and the day of completion (Completion) and with the Deal Value variable representing the acquisition value (in £millions).
CEO Power
Bebchuck and Fried (2003) link managerial power to remuneration levels. They establish that CEOs who have more power vis-à-vis their boards will be able to extract higher levels of rents in the form of managerial compensation. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) offer evidence on the ability of CEOs to affect the selection of directors. Furthermore, Bebchuck and Fried (2003) show that CEOs could discourage board members who oppose or disagree with them from participating on the board.
Following Zhao and Lehn (2003), we investigate whether internal control mechanisms can discipline CEOs who take on value-reducing acquisition decisions.
In order to address the issue of leadership structure and its possible effects on executive pay and shareholder wealth, we employ 3 dummy variables. The
Nominations and Remuneration variables, take the value 1 when the CEO is participating on his company's nominations and remuneration committees respectively, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the Chair variable takes the value of 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the company and 0 otherwise.
Further, the number of members in the Board (Board Size) and the ratio of executive to non-executive directors on the board (Ex-NE) could play an important role in eliminating CEO power and leading to improved performance through board independence. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) show that the board of directors is more independent as the number of outside directors' increases. Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Klein (1998) suggest that firms with a high percentage of independent directors may perform worse. Welsbach (1988) reports that the proportion of independent directors on large firm boards increases slightly when a company has performed poorly, and Bhagot and Black (2001) find a reasonably strong correlation between poor performance and subsequent increases in board independence. Yermack (1996) and Jensen (1993) show that larger numbers of board members are often associated with less effective board and higher managerial power.
We expect that insider-dominated boards are less independent. This leads to higher levels of CEO power over the setting of their pay and bonuses following M&A deals.
Empirical findings
Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 indicates that the number of M&A deals increased from 1998 to reach a peak in 1999 and declined thereafter overall for the UK market (Panel A) as well as for our sample (Panel B).
[ Figure 1 around here]
UK and US bidders differ in a number of respects. Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics and tests (t-statistics) of the differences in means for financial, deal and governance characteristics and executive pay characteristics respectively (both CEO and average (other) executive).
[ Tables 1 and 2 around here] (14%) in use. Method of pay models across the literature predict that shareholders of bidding companies are worse off in stock transactions compared to cash transactions. We report that, on average, there are significant differences in the levels of use of stocksettled acquisitions (7.4% of US and 55% of UK transactions). In a UK study covering the period 1988 , Draper and Paudyal (1991 report that cash acquirers do not experience any significant abnormal returns but stock acquisitions experience significant negative returns.
Our median UK bidder employs 9 directors on its board with some 55% of insiders whereas US boards employ 14 directors with 43% of insiders. While 74% of US CEOs are chairmen, this rarely happens in the UK (1 in 4 cases only). (£1.87m) respectively. The mean ratio of cash to total pay received by US (UK) CEOs following the acquisition is 87% (62%). Finally, there are significant differences in the change of salary plus bonus in the year following the acquisition (∆salary+bonus), with US CEOs experiencing an average (median) increase of 303% (63%) and UK just 43% (15%).
Panel B of Table 2 shows that there are significant differences in pay levels for the average executive (other than the CEO) of the UK and US bidding companies.
Such differences may be driven by the significant variation in average size between the US and UK bidding companies during the pre-and post-acquisition period.
Notably, whereas US executives receive higher levels of pay compared to their UK counterparts, they earn slightly lower ∆salary+bonus following the completion of the bid. The test (t-statistic) of the differences in the means for CEO and the average executive ∆salary+bonus (2.14) highlights the significant differences in pay across the firm's hierarchy.
Cross-section analysis
Following the Grinstein and Hribar (2004) The results for the full sample (N=100) are presented in Table 3 while those for the UK and US samples are given in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. [ Table 3 around here]
The first, second and third columns present estimates of the determinants of the total bonus, salary and salary plus bonus respectively received following completion of the deal.
The table shows that there is a positive relationship between company size and executive bonus pay (Panel B) and a negative and significant relation between the 2-day market-adjusted return following the acquisition announcement and CEO salary (Panel A). The CAR (-1;0) reflects the market's perception on the quality of the acquisition decision, and as a result, this evidence contradicts the traditional view that increases in managerial pay should follow performance (or valuable acquisition decisions). This evidence points towards the managerial power view under which managerial pay increases with respect to firm size and irrespectively of the value of the acquisition decision.
The table indicates that the cash elements of CEO remuneration are unaffected by either managerial effort or by skill since none of the relevant coefficients is significant at conventional levels. By contrast, managerial power variables emerge as significant drivers of CEO cash remuneration. More particularly, the coefficients on CEO chairmanship and Board Size are correctly signed and statistically significant at the 1% level for all three regression specifications (Panel A). In other words, CEOs with greater board influence earn higher levels of performance-related cash pay and larger boards award higher levels of cash pay to their CEOs. More precisely, CEOs that also serve as chairmen (or for every additional member on the board) receive an additional £3.06m (£410k) of bonus and £357k (£94.9k) of salary than their nonchairmen counterparts. In addition, Panel B indicates that executive directors who participate in large boards and whose CEO is powerful earn higher levels of cash pay.
For them, the combined CEO-chairman role (or every additional member on the board) increases bonus and salary by £830.6k and £286.1k (£90.18 and £40.39k) respectively.
Finally, we report that the ratio of executive to non-executive directors has a significantly positive effect on CEO salary pay which, although not very strong evidence, also supports the managerial power view that CEOs of less independent boards receive higher levels of cash pay. On the contrary, the Panel B results indicate a negative relation between the salary received by the average executive and the ratio of executive to independent directors. That indicates that (holding NE directors constant), while the CEO receives £233.5k more in salary for every additional executive director, the average executive experiences a significant decrease of £254.3k. This evidence is in line with the Bebchuck and Fried (2003) prediction and the Grinstein and Hribar (2004) US findings that high CEO power leads to higher levels of rent extraction through M&A deals. Note that our results are more striking than those of the latter study, which also found a significant role for managerial effort and skill variables. Our results are also consistent with those of Calgano (2004) who investigates a sample of the 510 largest UK firms during [1997] [1998] and shows that when the firm's stock price performance is low and the wealth of a CEO with large exposure to share price decreases, the CEO is paid a relatively higher level of cash compensation. As a result, "entrenchment not only eliminated the disciplining role of poorly performing management but also introduced a pernicious remuneration incentive scheme".
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The results for the three regression specifications for the UK (N=73) and the US (N=27) samples are given in Tables 4 and 5 Table 4 confirm that more complex acquisition deals lead to higher levels of bonus (CEO) and salary (other executive) pay. More precisely, for every £1m spent on the deal the CEO receives an additional £0.135k (£0.224k) bonus (salary+bonus) and the average executive's salary increases by £0.043k (£0.085k).
Note however that this interpretation is not straightforward. Whereas UK CEOs are compensated for the complexity and higher levels of effort and skill associated with large deals, these could also be the outcome of over investment and the subsequent failure of boards to monitor CEO decisions effectively as a result of managerial power. CEOs may receive the wrong signals from the existence of such a link between deal size and acquisition-related cash rewards and this could lead to managerial power exertion towards empire-building behavior for rent extraction.
To investigate further the relationship between CEO effort and pay components, we employ an Industry dummy variable. We expect that CEOs who 9 Calgano (2004), p.18. 10 The significance of the salary+bonus variable indicates that there is no substitution between the two elements of pay (i.e. salary and bonus).
engage in deals outside their own industry are rewarded differently due to less synergetic and integration problems and the subsequent lower demand for effort. The significantly negative results across Table 4 indicate that UK executives acquiring from a different industry receive lower levels of bonus (and salary). The bonus and salary of CEOs (the average executive) acquiring from outside their industry is £118.7k and £144.5k (£89.8k and £101.4k) lower than that of their counterparts acquiring within their industry. These results are in line with those of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) .
Traditional views on board size stipulate that keeping boards small can improve their performance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . The Board size coefficient in Table 4 is significantly positive at the 5% level for CEO bonus. While this diverges from that of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) , it reports surprise at finding a negative coefficient on this variable. This result implies that larger boards pay higher bonuses.
Finally, the table indicates that insider-dominated boards lead to lower levels of salary pay. More precisely, for an additional executive to non-executive director employed on the board, the CEO suffers a higher reduction to salary (£112.5k) as opposed to that realized by the average executive (£60.65k). 11 Zhao and Lehn (2003) show that CEO tenure is more sensitive to firm performance when outsiders (i.e. nonexecutive directors) form the majority of the board and that consequently, in line with Faccio and Lasfer (2000) , the board of directors is more independent as the number of outside directors increases.
Finally we analyse the results for our US sample given in Table 5 . The latter table
shows that CEO chairmanship significantly increases CEO salary and bonus cash pay although this result is significant at the 5 per cent level only for this sample.
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Furthermore, we find that the ratio of executive to non-executive directors is negatively related to salary pay (Panels A and B) at the 10% level.
Overall, our results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 outline the different wealth effects on CEO and average executive directors as a result of company performance, CEO skill and power exertion between UK and US bidders. We report that size is a driver of executive bonus and that there is a negative relationship between the market valuation of the deal and CEO salary. Whereas CEO chairmanship and board size significantly increases cash pay for both groups, CEOs enjoy around three times higher increases than their executive directors. Similar differences exist for the increases on UK cash pay driven by the deal value. By contrast, the subsequent decreases in UK CEO pay due to diversified acquisitions are higher than those for other executives. Taken as a whole, our results demonstrate that measures of CEO power rather than performance and executive effort and skill can explain the cross-sectional variation in the bonus and salary pay received following the completion of a M&A deal.
Concluding remarks
There is considerable debate surrounding CEO and other executive incentives for M&A deals and the association between such incentives and post-deal gains. This paper employs a sample of 100 UK and US bidders for [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] At the same time the finding on deal size raises concerns about possible rent extraction by CEOs who get involved in large acquisition deals to enjoy the associated increases in their cash pay. These are also in line with the finding of consistently significant coefficients on managerial power variable(s) across the full and sub-samples that imply that less board independence leads to higher levels of bonus. These support the evidence favoring the managerial power approach found in the US study of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) . They are also consistent with the Bebchuck and Fried (2003) and Bebchuck (2002) views that CEO power is a significant driver of compensation. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs may get involved in M&A bids due to self-dealing perks instead of shareholder value creation.
They raise concerns about the ability of existing corporate governance mechanisms to align CEO behavior to measures of performance. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Acquiring Firms The Table presents summary statistics for Total, UK and US CEO samples the year prior and following the acquisition deal and t-statistics from tests of the differences in Means between the UK and US CEO samples. Size is the book value of total assets; ROA is Earnings per share times number of shares divided by the book value of total assets; MTBV is the market-to-book ratio; Deal Value is GBP value of the acquisition deal (in millions); Completion is the log of the number of days between the deal announcement and the day of completion; CAR (-1;0) and CAR (-5;+5) are the cumulative abnormal returns in the respective event windows; Industry is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is acquiring from outside its industry and 0 otherwise; Method of Pay is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the deal settlement involves stock and 0 otherwise; Board Size is the number of members in the Board of Directors; Ex-NE Table 3 Post-Acquisition Cash Rewards, Performance and CEO Power The sample includes the full sample of 100 completed M&A deals of UK and US bidders for the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The dependent variables are bonus, salary and bonus plus salary received by the CEO (Panel A) and the average executive director (Panel B) the year following the acquisition. The independent variables are listed on the left-hand side of the Table. Size is the book value of total assets prior to the acquisition; Deal Value is the GBP value of the acquisition deal (in millions); CAR (-1;0) is the two-day market-adjusted return for the day prior to the deal announcement and the day of the merger announcement; Completion is the log of the number of days between the deal announcement and the day of completion; Industry is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is acquiring from outside its industry and 0 otherwise; Chairman is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CEO holds the Chairman position in the company; Nominations is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CEO is a member of the Nominations committee; Ex-NE Table 4 Post-Acquisition Cash Rewards, Performance and CEO Power The sample includes 73 completed M&A deals of UK bidders for the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The dependent variables are bonus, salary and bonus plus salary received by the CEO (Panel A) and the average executive director (Panel B) the year following the acquisition. The independent variables are listed on the left-hand side of the Table. Size is the book value of total assets prior to the acquisition; Deal Value is the GBP value of the acquisition deal (in millions); CAR (-1;0) is the two-day market-adjusted return for the day prior to the deal announcement and the day of the merger announcement; Completion is the log of the number of days between the deal announcement and the day of completion; Industry is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is acquiring from outside its industry and 0 otherwise; Chairman is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CEO holds the Chairman position in the company; Nominations is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the CEO is a member of the Nominations committee; Ex-NE 25.0% Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 (*), 10 (**) and 1 (***) percent levels respectively. 
